A Friendly Reply to David G. Meyers: Part One

[This is the first in a series of blogs in which I respond to a recently published book by acclaimed psychology professor, author, and columnist David G. Meyers. The book is called “A Friendly Letter to Skeptics and Atheists”; I recommend the book to anyone interested in religion and the “New Atheism”. It is available for purchase at amazon.com.]

As an atheist and opponent of religion in all its guises, let me first express appreciation for the letter you have written to me and my ilk. In the midst of what can only be called a propaganda war, in which misinformation and mudslinging seem to be the norm, your voice of open scholarship and good sense is much appreciated.

With your letter, you

aim to suggest to skeptical friends how someone might share their commitment to reason, evidence, and, yes, even skepticism while also embracing a faith that makes sense of the universe, gives meaning to life, connects us in supportive communities, mandates altruism, and offers hope in the face of adversity and death.

More specifically, you spelled out two goals. The first is to “affirm […] indictments of religion”, and the second is to argue that “a progressive, biblically rooted, ‘ever-reforming’ faith” is “reasonable, meaningful, hopeful, inspiring, science-affirming, and profoundly humane.”

In this multi-part reply, I want to tell why you have not succeeded in persuading me.

As I have understood your letter, its spine consists of a distinction between “Good Religion” and “Bad Religion”. You make this clear right away:

Framed positively, the new atheist books are not just an attack on mindless, unbending religion but an affirmation of reason, evidence, and critical intelligence. Therein lies our common ground. We agree:let’s, with a spirit of humility, put testable ideas to the test and then let’s throw out religion’s dirty bathwater. And we differ: is there amid the bathwater a respect-worthy baby – a reasonable and beneficial faith?

You make this distinction again in the chapter, “Simplistic Stereotypes”:

To lump together Mennonites, Reform Jews, and the Taliban – labeling them all as “religion” […] is to gloss over some very important distinctions. Catholic liberation theology and jihadist beheadings are, um, a little different.

Finally, you make this distinction again when you separate “nominal” religion, which “feeds prejudice”, from “genuine” religion, which fosters tolerance.

If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the objections raised against religion by atheists and skeptics do not apply to all forms and manifestations of religion. Put bluntly, it seems you would rather we not judge the faithful by their basest specimens. At the very least, you would like us to recognize and respect the diversity among the world’s faiths. Perhaps then we would see that faith is not in itself false and dangerous.

Perhaps you do not fully understand the nature of the skeptic’s objection to religion. While I cannot speak for all atheists, I believe that most of us object to religion primarily because it defies the available evidence by believing and organizing behavior around conclusions which that evidence does not sustain.

That religion has often been an engine of violence, oppression, intolerance, censorship, and toxic emotion is certainly a key part of our objection. However, it is chiefly the falsehood of the claims on which such dangerous behavior is based that frustrates us.

For consider: If faith were only false, and not dangerous, then atheists would have no grounds for objection, insofar as a the truth-content of a belief that does not motivate or inform behavior is irrelevant. Similarly, if faith were violent and oppressive, but based on evident truths, then we would still have no grounds for objection. For in that case, we would recognize the violence and oppression as sanctioned by the Highest Power.

Therefore, it is the conjunction of danger and falsehood that worries and offends us skeptics.

People with this objection to religion (that is, most atheists) will never be satisfied by your distinction between “moderate civil religious interpretations and violence-prone fundamentalist ones”. For I would paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and say that

Untruth anywhere is a threat to truth everywhere.

In other words, a lie is a lie is a lie, regardless of the desirability or undesirability of its consequences. The notion that belief in a proposition unsupported by reproducible, publicly available evidence ought to be sanctioned on the basis of its consequences is open to the following objections:

1. By condoning, and even requiring, a flagrant disrespect of evidence in one area, it encourages such disrespect in other areas. If we are to conclude beyond what the evidence allows in respect to the claims of religion, why can we not conclude beyond what the evidence allows in any number of other domains of human endeavor? Conversely, if in other domains we must restrict our assent to what is sustained by evidence, why ought we be released from this obligation in the single case of religion?

2. By supporting any religion, in spite of the falsehood of its claims, on the grounds that it provides people with a sense of meaning and an impetus to charity, we leave no check in place to safeguard anyone from the dangers that may ensue when that religion becomes an instrument of violence and oppression (as has often happened). In such a case, the religion might be opposed on the grounds that it is harmful; however, such harm will be easily justified by the truth of the religion’s claims, which will be impregnable insofar as no method has been established by which to judge it. However, if a method is used to judge the truth of the religion’s claims, that method will be the very scientific one which presently fails to support any theistic religion!

3. In the long run, no false belief, if acted on, can prove beneficial either to those who act on it or to those influenced by those who act on it. For instance, let us assume that the claims of religion are false, i.e., there is no God, no Savior, no Holy Spirit, no afterlife, etc. In this case, a great deal of what religion has accomplished, both for good and for ill, has been in vain. Incalculable amounts of time, money, land, labor, blood, thought, and breath will have been spent in the service of a fiction, where they could have been turned to more profitable use. For instance, instead of building multi-million-dollar megachurches where people can gorge themselves on fast food and stare dumbly at giant LED screens, we might have donated vast resources to ailing schools and libraries, funded research into various diseases and disorders, or injected capital into the ailing economies of developing countries. It is for this reason – that we may use our resources to best advantage – that we must test our convictions well and constantly.

4. It is only within the context provided by the available evidence that danger and promise can be realistically assessed. To illustrate this, only imagine how differently these dangers and this promise appear on the supposition that Jesus has redeemed the world and will return for his “elect” from how they appear on the supposition that he has not and will not. These are very different worldviews with very different sets of priorities and implications, both for individuals and the global human community. What cannot be argued by anyone is that one of these suppositions is severely misguided. Either we test them against each other now, using the scientific method, or we test them later with the welfare of ourselves and the environment that sustains us.

What would you say of a doctor who gave a pleasing diagnosis despite very unpleasing lab tests? Or of an economist who advised everyone to act as though the economy were flush, when his analysis strongly suggests that it is sick? Would you applaud their insistence on optimism, or would you find fault with their glad tidings? I do not doubt that you would do the latter.

In short, no matter how innocuous or even helpful it may appear on its face, every body of doctrine unsupported by evidence is contrary to the interests of the global human community.

To Be Continued